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FEDERAL INTERFERENCE WITH CHECKS AND
BALANCES IN STATE GOVERNMENT:
A CONSTITUTIONAL LIMIT ON
THE SPENDING POWER

The contribution of federal grant money to state budgets has
so increased in amount and changed in form that state legislatures
increasingly find themselves with little real control over substantial portions of state expenditures. By 1976, federal aid to many
states constituted over twenty per cent of the state budget; 1 moreover, a significant amount of this aid is now in the form of "block
grants" administered by state agencies with great discretion over
their utilization. 2 The federal statutes give planning responsibilities
almost exclusively to the state agencies and assign almost no role
to the state legislatures in the use of block grants. 3 As a result, legislators must increasingly submit not to Congress's priorities but to
those set by state bureaucrats and specialists usually representing the
executive branch of state government.
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No. 76-4: STATE LEisLATuREs AND FEDERAL Gna.rs 1 (1976) [hereinafter cited as ACIR BULL.]; see Shapp v. Sloan, 480 Pa. 449, 459, 468, 391 A.2d
595, 600, 604 (1978), appeal dismissed sub nom. Thomburgh v. Casey, 440 U.S.
942 (1979).
TION BULL.

2From 1968 to 1976, block grants increased from less than 3% of federal aid
to approximately 12%. ACIR BULL., supra note 1, at 2. In contrast, categorical
grants, which still account for a large majority of federal grants, normally have
elaborate conditions attached regulating precisely how the funds may be spent.
The exact number of block-grant programs "depends on who does the counting." Dam, The American Fiscal Constitution, 44 U. Cm. L. REv. 271, 315 (1977).
There are at least five block-grant programs: the Comprehensive Employment and
Training Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 801-992 (1976); the Partnerships for Health Act, 42
U.S.C. § 246 (1976); the Social Services Amendments of 1974, id. §§ 1397-1397f;
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, id. §§ 3701-3796c; the Community Block Development Grant portion of the Housing Community Development
Act of 1974, id. §§ 5301-5317. See U.S. ADVIsoRY CommissioN oN INTErcovERN-

iENTAL RELATIONS, BLoCK GANTS: A ROUNDTABLE DIScuSsION, No. A-51 at ii

[hereinafter cited as

RouNDTABLE];

Dam, supra, at 315.

For instance, under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 3701-3796c (1976) ("Crime Control Act"), the legislature's only role is
an advisory review of the state administrative agency's comprehensive plan. See
id. § 3726; text accompanying notes 17-28 infra.
The Crime Control Act is exceptional for block-grant programs because of its
explicit definition of executive and legislative responsibility. More often, Congress
requires that a grant program be administered by a state agency without specifying
in which branch of government the agency is to be located. E.g., Elementary and
Secondary Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 241g (1976); Partnerships for Health Act,
42 U.S.C. §246(a)(2) & (d)(2) (1976), legislative appropriation or participation
is not prohibited by other statutes; rather, it is simply not mentioned.
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In the legislatures' view, their resulting loss of control "is at the
heart of the practical exercise of power at the state level. If we
cannot control the purse strings, then we are nothing." 4 To regain

control of the purse strings, at least two state legislatures have
passed "reappropriation acts" giving themselves express power to
appropriate, project by project, all federal funds flowing to the state
government.6 Where the federal laws creating the grants assign
no such role to the legislatures, the state and federal laws may conflict, and the state law would thus be held invalid under the supremacy clause 6 unless the federal law were found to be unconstitutional.
This Comment examines one possible limit to constitutionality -whether a federal law specifying that the executive, rather
than legislative, branch of a state government receive and spend federal grant money intrudes so substantially on state sovereignty s
that it violates the tenth amendment.9 This issue was present but
4 ACIR BULL., supra note 1, at 14 (remarks of Harold Schreier to the National
Conference of State Legislatures). Mr. Schreier also noted that there is a continuing "struggle to keep the Madison check and balance system of three coequal
branches of government, and the legislatures of this country are losing." Id.
tit 72, §§ 4611-4617 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80); S.D. Comp.
5 PA. STAT. AwN.
LAws ANN. § 4-8B-10 (Supp. 1978). Another one-third of the states normally include many federal grants in their appropriations and thus could, at least theoretically, exert control over how federal funds are spent within the state. See ACIR
BuLL., supra note 1, at 13. This Bulletin urges all states to adopt "reappropriation"
statutes like those of Pennsylvania and South Dakota. Id.
0 U.S. CONsT. art VI, cl. 2.
7 Other possible limits are provided by the Bill of Eights. See generally, e.g.,
O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits With Strings Attached, 54
L. REv. 443 (1966); Wilcox, Invasions of the First Amendment Through
CAL.
Conditioned Public Spending, 41 CoRmrL L.Q. 12 (1955); Note, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 73 HAav. L. REv. 1595 (1960).
8 See Shapp v. Sloan, 480 Pa. 449, 478, 391 A.2d 595, 609 (1978), appeal
dismissed sub nom. Thornburgh v. Casey, 440 U.S. 942 (1979) (dissent).
9A finding of unconstitutionality of intrusions on state sovereignty is often
grounded in the tenth amendment. E.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833, 842-43 (1976) ("NLC"). Some commentators, however, would base it
on a principle "deeper" than that articulated in the tenth amendment. E.g.,
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The R6le of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 CoLmJ. L. REV. 543,
544-45 (1954). Although this Comment refers to violations of the "tenth amendment," it should be understood as referring to constitutional guarantees of state
sovereignty, from wherever derived.
For other commentary on post-NLC tenth-amendment limitations on congressional spending power, see generally Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of
Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy,
86 YALE L.J. 1196 (1977); Comment, Toward New Safeguards on Conditional
Spending: Implications of National League of Cities v. Usery, 26 Am. U. L. RBv.
726 (1977) [hereinafter cited as New Safeguards]; Note, Municipal Bankruptcy,
the Tenth Amendment and the New Federalism, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1871 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Municipal Bankruptcy]. See also Barber, National League of
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not fully explored when Pennsylvania's reappropriation act, Act
117,10 was challenged by the governor in Shapp v. Sloan." With Act
117, the Pennsylvania legislature refused to appropriate that part of
a block grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) that would have funded a special prosecutor within
the executive branch. Governor Shapp argued that the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (Crime Control Act),' which
created LEAA, explicitly bars legislative control of federal monies
received under it.13 The state supreme court, however, upheld the
statute. Although the United States Supreme Court refused to
hear an appeal, 14 probably for procedural reasons, 15 the apparent
conflict between federal and state law remains. Thus, when a case
arises in the proper procedural posture, this conflict will require the
Court to face this constitutional issue.
Because that particular controversy demonstrates well the important federal-state conflict that is the subject of this Comment,
part I outlines the LEAA block-grant program and Act 117 and
traces the Pennsylvania governor's challenge to Act 117 in Shapp
v. Sloan. Part II(A) examines the constitutionality of Congress's
vesting control of its grants in a particular branch of state government, especially in light of National League of Cities v. Usery
("NLC").16 Part II(B) concludes that under normal spending-power
analysis, even after NLC, grant conditions that affect the structure
of state government do not violate the tenth amendment. Part
II(C), however, concludes that the peculiar interference with state
sovereignty caused when state legislatures are all but excluded from
the block-grant process creates an exception to the normal analysis
and therefore violates the tenth amendment. Part III suggests that
even if mandating executive control of block grants is constitutional,
considerations of state sovereignty and federalism limit the relief
a federal court can give to a state governor in disputes in which the
legislature has blocked the executive from carrying out the terms of
the federal grant.
Cities v. Usery: New Meaning for the Tenth Amendment?, 1976 Sup. CT. REv. 161;
Held% The Tenth Amendment Iceberg, 30 HAT INGs L.J. 1763 (1979); Ripple &
Kenyon, State Sovereignty-A Polished But Slippery Crown, 54 No=R Dwmv L.
745 (1979).
10PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 4611-4617 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
11480 Pa. 449, 391 A.2d 595 (1978), appeal dismissed sub nom. Thornburgh
v. Casey, 440 U.S. 942 (1979).
1242 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3796c (1976).
13 Id. § 3726. See note 3 supra.
14Thornburgh v. Casey, 440 U.S. 942 (1979).
15 See text accompanying notes 52-55 infra.
16 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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I. A CASE HISTORY

A. The Statutory Conflict: The Legislature's Role under
LEAA and Act 117
The Crime Control Act directs that LEAA block grants be
administered by the state's executive branch. 1 7 Under the Act, an
agency "subject to the jurisdiction of the [state's] chief executive" 18
submits an annual comprehensive plan to the LEAA 19 and receives
and disburses funds according to the plan. 20
The legislature, in contrast, has almost no role. Originally,
the legislature was not even mentioned in the Crime Control Act,
but the Act was amended in 1976 to give the legislature an optional
advisory review of the agency's comprehensive plan.21 Committee
reports,2 2 floor debate,23 and defeat of measures designed to give the
legislature control of LEAA funds 24 underscore the limited, nonbinding role that Congress intended for the legislatures. The
Senate Report said:
[P]lacing the State planning agency under the jurisdiction
of the State legislature rather than the chief executive
1742 U.S.C. §3723(a)(1)

(1976). See id. §§3732(a), 3733(a)(1).
§ 3723(a)(1).
19Id. §§ 3723(b)(1), 3732(a), 3733(a).
20
The LEAA "shall make grants under this chapter to a State planning agency."
Id. § 3733(a) (emphasis added).
21 The amended provision reads:
At the request of the State legislature . . . the comprehensive statewide plan shall be submitted to the legislature for an advisory review prior
to its submission to the Administration by the chief executive of the State.
In this review the general goals, priorities, and policies that comprise [sic]
the basis of that plan, including possible conflicts with State statutes or
prior legislative Acts, shall be considered. If the legislature . . . has not
reviewed the plan forty-five days after receipt, such plans [sic] shall then
be deemed reviewed.
Id. § 3726.
22 S. REP. No. 94-847, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17, reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5374, 5381-82; H.R. REt'. No. 94-1155, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 7, 13, 20 ("This section does not give approval or disapproval power to State
legislatures over the plans.").
23 Senator Dirksen noted:
We are never going to do a job in this field until we have a captain at the
top, in the form of the Governor, and those he appoints, to coordinate
matters for a state ....
38Id.

the

.

[Ihf we are going to do a job, it has to be unfragmented, and

the only way it can be done is to make certain that this goes from the top

down and that it goes through the hands of the Governors of the States.
114 CoNG. lEc. 14753 (1968).
24
See S. lEP. No. 94-847, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws 5374, 5381; H.R. REP. No. 94-1155, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 7.
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would be inappropriate. It would be inconsistent with
the centralized and coordinated statewide planning that is
one of the key elements of the LEAA program and render
close supervision more difficult. Such a structuring of the
program would also create a greater danger of politiciza25
tion of the LEAA effort.

Congress had not yet provided for this advisory legislative
review when Pennsylvania's Act 117 was passed; 20 thus, other than
through control of matching funds, 27 state legislatures had no role in
the administration of LEAA grants. 28

Indeed, other oversight tools,

such as line-by-line matching, were ineffective,2 9 and the Pennsyl25 S. REP. No. 94-847, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CoNG. & An. NEws 5374, 5381.
26 Act 117 was passed over the governor's veto on June 29, 1976. 1976 Pa.
Laws 469. Advisory review was enacted on October 15, 1976 by Pub. L. No.
94-503, § 108, 90 Stat. 2411 (1976).
27 Almost all LEAA federal grants require some state matching funds.
See,
e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 3724, 3736(a), 3746(e), 3750d(a) (1976). This match requirement does not, however, enable the state legislature to set priorities within the
comprehensive LEAA plan or delete specific projects. See note 29 infra.
28 A legislature admittedly could hold oversight hearings and conduct investigations into state LEAA programs. S. REP'. No. 94-847, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16,
reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5374, 5382. The legislature may
also be able to block specific elements of a state agency's plan before it is submitted
to LEAA by passing substantive, not appropriations, measures. "Because the LEAA
will not approve a state plan that is inconsistent with state law, the legislature also
can require the elimination from a proposed plan of a specific project by enacting
a statute prohibiting the implementation of the project." Brief for the United States
as Amicus Curiae, at 16, Thornburgh v. Casey, 440 U.S. 942 (1979) (footnote
omitted) [hereinafter cited as Solicitor's Brief].
While this technique may be viable now that the state legislature can review
a state agency's plan before its submission to LEAA, the legislature has no practical
means of influencing the application of LEAA funds once the advisory review is
done. For a discussion of whether this substantive review is an adequate substitute
for the appropriation power, see text accompanying notes 123-27 infra. Indeed, it
is unclear that this veto power over specific projects was contemplated by Congress,
which referred to the nonbinding nature of the advisory review and its focus on
"general goals, priorities, and policies." See notes 21 & 22 supra.
29 Because of "aggregate" and "overmatch" funding concepts, a state agency
can obtain full funding for a project despite the state legislature's refusal to supply
matching funds for that project. The Crime Control Act does not require that the
state provide matching funds for each project but only that the "aggregate" state
funding for the total LEAA program match the total federal funding (at a 9:1
ratio). See 42 U.S.C. § 3731(c) (1976); H.R. lE. No. 93-249, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 6, reprinted in [1973] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nmvs 1729, 1732. Furthermore, the state agency may take federal funds that are unnecessary to one project
(because the legislature appropriated more than is required) and apply that "overmatch" to a project that the legislature refused to fund:
The matching provisions may be properly interpreted to permit overmatch
in one program to apply to other programs within a functional category.
. .. This interpretation should be helpful to the States that are going
to have problems getting matching funds from their legislatures, since
LEAA will permit them to seek 100 percent funding by the legislatures
of programs that they can sell to the legislature and apply the overmatch
to other programs that are not as attractive to the legislature.
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vania General Assembly moved to take control of LEAA grants 30
by passing Act 117.31- Through this statute the legislature, which
felt that the increased use of federal funds had "undermined . ..
[its] control of state spending," intended to reassert full control over
32
the state budget.
Act 117 requires that all federal funds be pooled with the state's
general revenues8 3 and that no general revenues be spent without
specific legislative appropriation, even if the funds were received
from the federal government as matching funds for specific projects." The funds are then allocated annually by the General Assembly.m
The General Assembly then immediately provoked a crisis by
refusing to allocate funds granted by the LEAA for the controversial
Office of the Special Prosecutor. 6 Warning that Pennsylvania could
LEAA Legal Op. No. 71-7, at 45 (1971), reprinted in Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1984, 1985; see LEAA Legal Op. No. 74-56,
at 68 (1974); LEAA Legal Op. No. 74-60, at 76 (1974); Record at 402a-03a,
Shapp v. Sloan, 480 Pa. 449, 391 A.2d 595 (1978). Overmatch may also be used
between fiscal years. LEAA Legal Op. No. 74-56, at 68-69.
Thus, subprogram or "line" appropriations of matching funds become, in effect,
irrelevant, as the Pennsylvania General Assembly discovered when it first tried to
scuttle the controversial Office of the Special Prosecutor by refusing to appropriate
matching funds for that project. The governor's state-planning agency responded
by obtaining permission from LEAA to employ the overmatch technique and
thereby support the special prosecutor exclusively on federal funds. Record at
403a-07a. The overmatch concept, as thus applied, survived two court tests in
Gwinn v. Kane, 465 Pa. 269, 285, 348 A.2d 900, 908 (1975), and Myers v. Kane,
23 Pa. Commw. Ct. 213, 217, 350 A.2d 909, 911 (1976), persuading the legislature
that, if it wanted to screen projects or conform LEAA expenditures to its own
priorities, it would have to appropriate the federal grants itself.
30
In fiscal year 1976, LEAA block grants to Pennsylvania were greater than
$40,000,000. See EiGH~h ANNuAL REPoRT OF LEAA 95 (1976).
31
PA. STAT. ANN.tit 72, §§ 4611-4617 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
82 ACIR BuLL.., supra note 1, at 2 (remarks of Michael Hershock, Exec. Dir.,
Pa. House Approp. Comm.). Hershock said that the increased federal presence
had occurred without a concurrent change in the way the General Assembly reviews the state's budget. The additional spending power and the
additional flexibility which resulted from this growth in federal funds had
been used almost exclusively to strengthen the hand of the [state] executive branch in the budgetary process.
Id.
33
PA. STAT. ArN. tit.
72, § 4615 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
34 Id. §§ 4613-4614.
35
The General Assembly passes annual "Federal Augmentation Appropriation
Acts." E.g., Act No. 12-A, 1977 Pa. Laws 452; Act No. 17-A, 1976 Pa. Laws 1383.
36 See Shapp v. Sloan, 480 Pa. 449, 482-83, 391 A.2d 595, 611-12 (1978),
appeal dismissed sub nom. Thornburgh v. Casey, 440 U.S. 942 (1979) (dissent);
Phila. Evening Bull., June 29, 1976, at 1, col. 2; Phila. Inquirer, July 1, 1976, at 1,
coL 5; id., June 30, 1976, § B, at 1, col. 6.
The General Assembly had previously tried to terminate the special prosecutor's
office by refusing to provide state matching funds. See note 29 supra.
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as a result lose all of its funds under the Crime Control Act, the
LEAA contended that the General Assembly's actions contradicted
federal law:
The Pennsylvania Acts... appropriate LEAA monies
in a manner inconsistent with the State's comprehensive
...

plans and are in derogation of the Governor's respon-

sibility to develop and implement State comprehensive
plans pursuant to the Crime Control Act. The refusal of
the State Treasurer to honor previously approved fund
requisitions contravenes the act and the LEAA grant conditions upon which the State of Pennsylvania received its
37
LEAA funding.
Governor Shapp then went to court to force appropriation of funds
for the special prosecutor3 8
B. The Governor's Challenge-Shappv. Sloan
In Shapp v. Sloan,3 9 a plurality 4 0 of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court upheld the General Assembly's reappropriation of all federal
grants. Before reaching this issue, the court had to decide that the
state constitution permitted the state legislature to reappropriate
federal grants.41 Indeed, in past disputes between state executives
and legislatures, state judges had resolved the cases on state-law
grounds, focusing on what constitutes "public funds." In short,
superficial opinions, they uniformly held that "federal contributions
are not the subject of the appropriation power of the legislature." 42
37 LEAA Legal Op. No. 77-5, at 309, 310 (1977).
38 See Shapp v. Sloan, 480 Pa. 449, 391 A.2d 595 (1978), appeal dismissed

sub nom. Thornburgh v. Casey, 440 U.S. 942 (1979). The Governor stated:
I am directing the Attorney General to take immediate steps to
invalidate [Act 117] . . . and to invalidate the entire act which I now
must reluctantly sign and to establish the principle that Federal funds go
directly to the State or local government named in the Federal statute
or regulation involved.
1976 Pa. Laws 1423 (remarks of Gov. Shapp, signing the Federal Augmentation
Appropriation Act of 1976, Act No. 17-A, 1976 Pa. Laws 1383).
39480 Pa. 449, 391 A.2d 595 (1978), appeal dismissed sub nom. Thornburgh
v. Casey, 440 U.S. 942 (1979).
4
oJustice Manderino's opinion was joined by two other justices. Justice Pomeroy concurred in the result without opinion. Justice Roberts, joined by one other
justice, filed a dissenting opinion. See id. at 476, 391 A.2d at 608.
41 Id. at 463-68, 391 A.2d at 602-04.
42
MacManus v. Love, 179 Colo. 218, 222, 499 P.2d 609, 610 (1972); see
State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 86 N.M. 359, 370, 524 P.2d 975, 986 (1974);
accord, Navajo Tribe v. Arizona Dep't of Administration, 111 Ariz. 279, 280-81,
528 P.2d 623, 624-25 (1974).
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The plurality of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that
past interpretations of "public funds" were irrelevant because
earlier courts "could not anticipate that.., federal funds would constitute a large portion of the budgets of most states." 43 The justices warned that growing federal aid coupled with exclusive gubernatorial control would "eliminate the need for a legislative
branch of government," 44 violating the doctrine of separation of
powers. Federal grants were therefore "public funds" and subject
to legislative reappropriation under the Pennsylvania Constitution. 45
Thus embarking on a new trail, the Shapp plurality addressed
the federal constitutional question and announced that it found no
"clear and direct" conflict between state and federal law that would
trigger the supremacy clause. 46 It said:

Nothing in the federal legislation.., suggests that the
...

principles [of separation of powers] by which programs

wholly state funded are operated are inapplicable to programs for which federal funds are supplied. That the executive agency or official must use federal monies within
the program for which they were intended, and must provide an accounting to show that they were so used, does
not lead to the conclusion that the funds are under that
official's
control and outside the control of the legislature. 47
In reaching this decision, the court gave inadequate attention
to the words and legislative history of the Crime Control Act. Instead, it relied on recommendations of the Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) 48 in support of more legislative participation in grant programs. Because most other federal
grant statutes were silent on the issue of state legislative participation, 49 and because recent federal policy was geared towards giving
43 480 Pa. at 466, 391 A.2d at 603.
44 Id. at 468, 391 A.2d at 604.

§ 24.
46 480 Pa. at 472, 391 A.2d at 606.
45 PA. CoNsT. art. III,

47 Id. at 469, 391 A.2d at 604.
48 Id. at 470-71, 391 A.2d at 605-06 (citing ACIR BuLL.., supra note 1).
49

See note 3 supra. The subject is further clouded in that one-third of the
states commonly appropriate federal grants, see note 5 supra, arguably with
Congress's tacit consent. Indeed, even the dissenters in Shapp seemed unconvinced

that gubernatorial control was mandated in every grant program. 480 Pa. at 478,
291 A.2d at 609 n.3.
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state governments more discretion over administration, the justices
concluded that "it cannot... be considered an encroachment uport
federal supremacy that the legislature, rather than the executive,
exercises the discretion granted the state government by the Congress."

50

Although Shapp v. Sloan surely raises a crucial issue of federalism, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for want of a
substantial federal question. 51 The Solicitor General's brief, filed
at the Court's request,5 2 strongly suggests that the appeal was dismissed for procedural reasons rather than because the Court thought
there were no substantial questions.
The Solicitor General pointed out that no matter how the substantive issues were decided, the Governor would not be entitled
to declaratory relief: 53
[I]t makes no difference whether the appellants [including the governor] are correct in their contention that the
state appropriation acts are inconsistent with Title I [of
the Crime Control Act]. If, as appellants maintain, Act
No. 117 violates the conditions of eligibility for the federal
grant, then Pennsylvania is not entitled to receive the federal funds whose availability is conditioned on compliance
with the federal terms ....
And if appellants are incorrect
in their interpretation of Title I, the result is the same,
because then federal law provides no impediment to the
legislative decision to withhold funds from the Special
Prosecutor's Office ....
[N]o declaration could have produced-or would in the future produce-the fiscal controls
appellants seek.54
50 480 Pa. at 470, 391 A.2d at 605.
A sharp dissent was filed demonstrating the conflict between state and federal
law. The dissenters concluded that the legislature could not "prevent the stateexecutive from using federal funds for the purpose for which they were granted to
the state by Congress and the LEAA." Id. at 479, 391 A.2d at 609.
51

Thornburgh v. Casey, 440 U.S. 942 (1979).

52439 U.S. 1043 (1978); see Solicitor's Brief, supra note 28, at 1.
53 The governor sought both declaratory relief and a permanent injunction
requiring release of funds for the special prosecutor. The demise of the special
prosecutor's office mooted the injunction request. Solicitor's Brief, supra note 28,
at 14. In addition to the reasons cited in the text and the mootness of part of
the case, the appeal presented another problem: the question on appeal may have
been so broadly stated as to render the issue non-justiciable. Id. 9-12. But see id12-14.
54

Id. 18-19 (footnotes omitted).
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Although there was no substantial federal question, the Solicitor
General agreed that the Court would have to decide a similar case
-if the procedural posture were different:
[T1he question of the consistency of a state reappropriation act with a federal grant statute properly could be
raised by a state's challenge to a federal agency's refusal
to make such a grant on the ground that the state act was
inconsistent with the terms of the congressional offer of
assistance. 55
-Thus, if the question were properly raised, and the Court found
that the state and federal laws were inconsistent, it would then have
to decide if the federal law unconstitutionally impinged on state
-sovereignty.
II.

THE

CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

A. National League of Cities v. Usery
The broad rhetoric of National League of Cities v. Usery
("NLC") r6 breathed new life into state sovereignty as a constitu-tional limit on Congress's powers. In NLC, the Court held that
57
the minimum-wage and maximum-hour provisions of a federal law
-were unconstitutional as interferences "with traditional aspects of
state sovereignty." 58 In attempting to set the wages and hours of
employees of state governments, said the Court, Congress was using
"its power in a fashion that would impair the States' 'ability to
function effectively in a federal system.' " Because this "exercise
. . . operate[s] to directly displace the States' freedom to structure

integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions,
... [it is] not within the authority granted Congress by Art. I, § 8,
cl. 3." 59

NLC leaves unclear exactly which state sovereignty interests
are protected by the Constitution. 0 When NLC refers to "in55 Id. 19 n.17.
56426 U.S. 833 (1976).
57

Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976).

58 426 U.S. at 849.
59 Id. 852 (citations omitted).

60 See, e.g., id. 880 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Field, The Eleventh Amendment
-and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Congressional Imposition of Suit Upon
the States, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 1203, 1220-21 (1978); Michelman, States' Rights

-and States' Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v.
Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165, 1172 (1977); Tribe, Unraveling National League of
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tegral governmental functions" or undoubted "attributes of sovereignty," 61 it seems to contemplate an ill-defined category of
services, such as sanitation and fire protection. 2 Still, the language
of NLC is broad enough 3 to have led many commentators to agree
that Congress may not "insist that a state alter its basic governmental structure." 6 Typical of this view is Professor Stewart's
position that NLC protects two aspects of state sovereignty: the
liberty to determine which services to provide, and "the liberty to
determine the structure of state and local governmental decisionmaking machinery and the concomitant ability to operate that machinery." 65 The interest in structural independence "is weightier
because it is more basic and logically prior to" the interest in local
services. 66 There is, then, a strong argument that protection of a
state's system of checks and balances from the sort of intrusion
caused by block-grant programs is a more important interest.
Thus, NLC suggests that if the Crime Control Act, by altering

the existing relationship between the executive and legislative
branches of state government, interferes with a state's liberty to
structure and operate "decisionmaking machinery," then it might be
unconstitutional.8 7 The LEAA grant programs of the Crime Control Act, however, unlike the legislation invalidated in NLC, are
Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HAv. L. REv. 1065, 1069, 1072-75 (1977); Municipal Bankruptcy, supra
note 9, at 1881-82; Comment, Applying the Equal Pay Act to State and Local
Governments: The Effect of National League of Cities v. Usery, 125 U. PA. L. Rv.
665, 672-76 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Equal Pay Act].
61 426 U.S. at 845.
62

See id. 851.

63 There is language in the Court's opinion that suggests a broader range of
state sovereignty interests than mere management of public service. Justice Rehnquist cited Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911), which reserved to the state the
right to choose the location of its capital, for the proposition that "there are
attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state government which may not be
impaired by Congress." Id. 845.
64

L.

TamE,

AMERcAN CoNsTrruTIoNAL LAw 302 (1978).

See also G. Gun-

125 (9th ed. 1975); Dam, supra note 2, at 293-94;
Stewart, supra note 9, at 1231; Municipal Bankruptcy, supra note 9, at 1886-88.
65 Stewart, supra note 9, at 1231.

THEE, CoNsTrroNL LAW

66

Id. 1232.

67 Although

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Shapp omitted reference to
NLC, the trial court had explicitly questioned the constitutionality, after NLC, of
congressional bypass of the state legislature. 27 Pa. Commw. Ct. 312, 325 n.4,
367 A.2d 791, 799 n.4 (1976). The dissent in the state supreme court, in contrast,
dismissed NLC, saying that gubernatorial control of federal block grants by no
means limits any "undoubted attribute of state sovereignty." 480 Pa. at 478, 391
A.2d at 609 (dissent).
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not based on the commerce power; 68rather, they are grounded in
the spending power.69 Further, the Court in NLC expressly reserved opinion on whether congressional interference with state
sovereignty would be unconstitutional if exercised through the
spending, rather than the commerce, power.7 0 As the next section
will show, courts have allowed interference with state sovereignty
through the spending power even after NLC.
B. Sovereignty and the Spending Power
Prior to NLC, the Supreme Court consistently upheld Con-

gress's right to impose conditions on federal grants, even if Congress

accomplished a

result that would be unconstitutional

if

achieved other than through the spending power.7 1 In the landmark 1937 case of Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,72 the Supreme
Court said that a grant could neither "coerce" the states 73 nor
"call for a surrender . . . of powers essential to their quasi-sover-

eign existence," 74 but Justice Cardozo's opinion questioned whether
federal legislation that induces the states to act by promise of
federal funds could ever be deemed "coercive." 75 Ten years later,,
in Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Commission,7 a state
challenged a federal ultimatum that it remove its highway commis-

sioner for engaging in local political activity or give up federal highway assistance funds.

Oklahoma's contention that the grant condi-

68 U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

69 Id. cl. 1.
70
"We express no view as to whether different results might obtain if Congress
seeks to affect integral operations of state governments by exercising authority
granted it under other sections of the Constitution such as the spending power,
Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, or § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." 426 U.S. at 852 n.17.
Many commentators argue, however, that if constitutional principles of federalism
outside article I protect state sovereignty, then the same principles limit all article I
powers. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 9, at 1254; New Safeguards, supra note 9,
at 745; Municipal Bankruptcy, supra note 9, at 1884.
71 In United States v. Butler, the Supreme Court adopted the view that the
spending power, art. I, § 8, cL 1, is a positive grant of power to spend. "Congress
... has a substantive power to tax and to appropriate, limited only by the requirement that it shall be exercised to provide for the general welfare of the United
States." 297 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1936). Thus the Court later was able to say that
although "the United States is not concerned with, and has no power to regulate,
local political activities as such of state officials, it does have power to fix the terms
upon which its money allotments to states shall be disbursed." Oklahoma v. United
States Civil Serv. Comrn'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947).
72301 U.S. 548 (1937).
73lId. 589.
7-Id.593.
75 Id. 589-90.
76 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
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tion invaded its sovereignty was rejected because, as stated in an
earlier case, "the statute imposes no obligation but simply extends.
an option which the State is free to accept or reject." 77 Oklahoma
is the most serious obstacle to any state-protecting limitation on
the spending power: if acceptance of federal funds entitles the
federal government to insist that a state official be discharged, then
Congress might also impose a particular governmental structure on
states as a condition of receiving federal aid.
Further, the Supreme Court upheld the condition in a more
recent case involving a clash between federal grant conditions and
a state's constitutional spending provisions. In Wheeler v. Barrera,78 Missouri argued that its constitution barred it from allocating
any public funds, including its share of federal aid, to any private
school, thus preventing compliance with Title I of the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act of 196579 requiring special programs
for both private- and public-school students. Although the Court
instructed the state agency to "accommodate" the federal conditions
with the state constitution, it further suggested that if conditions
continued to clash with state spending proscriptions as interpreted
by the state supreme court, 0 then the state either had to change its
constitution or forfeit the federal grant. "[I]llegality under state
law" would not be a defense to a charge of noncompliance. 81
No court besides Oklahoma or Wheeler has deemed the fiscal
dilemma posed by potential loss of substantial federal aid to
be coercive.82 Because states are now so dependent on federal
77Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 480 (1923); see Oklahoma v. United
States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143-44 (1947).
78417 U.S. 402 (1974).

7920 U.S.C. §§241a-241o (1976).
so The Court rejected the solution of the court of appeals, which had said that
federal funds were subject only to federal laws and not affected by any state constitutional proscription. On the contrary, said the Wheeler Court, "whether federal
aid is money 'donated to any state fund for public school purposes' within the
meaning of the Missouri Constitution . . . is purely a question of state and not
federal law." 417 U.S. at 418-19. Accordingly, were a case like Shapp to be
heard on the merits by the Court, it is possible that the justices would begin their
analysis by accepting the state court's determination of whether federal grants were
affected by the state constitution.
81 Id. 420. The Court indicated that such an attempt at accommodation and

compromise was appropriate in this case because the legislative history of the Act

"evinced a clear intention that state constitutional spending proscriptions not be

preempted as a condition of accepting federal funds." Id. 417.
82 See L. TamE, supra note 64, § 5.10; Dam, supra note 2, at 292-93. For
example, the court in North Carolina ex rel. Morrow v. Califano, 445 F. Supp. 532
(E.D.N.C. 1977), aff'd mem., 435 U.S. 962 (1978), was unmoved by the state's
prediction that it would lose $50,000,000 because a federal grant condition con-

flicted with the state constitution.

In County of Los Angeles v. Marshall, 442
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aid 8 3 that federal conditions under the spending power have the
same practical effect as mandatory regulations under the commerce
power, many commentators argue that the "option" of Oklahoma 8
is no longer realistic 8 and that the NLC limits on the commerce

power apply equally to the spending power. 88

Indeed, if ever a

spending-power case presented a strong state-autonomy interest
s7
Shapp
worthy of protection, Shapp v. Sloan would seem to be it.
should qualify as the kind of "extreme case" expressly anticipated
after NLC by at least two commentators, who recommended that
courts invalidate any federal grant condition that requires "drastic
or unusual restructuring of state governmental machinery" 88 or
"subvert[s] the independence of state legislatures." 89
Two recent cases, however, indicate that NLC has not made
grant conditions subject to tenth-amendment attack, even when a
federal grant seeks to dictate a certain governmental structure as a
condition for receiving financial aid. Although neither case involves a state's system of checks and balances, each confronts the
sovereignty issue and suggests that limits to the spending power
exist only for extreme or unsual constraints on the structure of state

government.90
F. Supp. 1186 (D.D.C. 1977), the court upheld federal grant conditions against a
tenth-amendment challenge despite assertions that compliance would result in virtual
bankxuptcy of some cities:
The Court notes these allegations with sadness; this Court has merely done
its duty to apply the law .... The Court is confident that a concerted
effort by federal executive, legislative, and state and local branches of
government can and must find a solution to the social and economic problems involving the people and governmental entities which are affected
directly and indirectly by the issues raised herein.
Id. 1192 n.5.
83 See notes 2 & 30 supra and text accompanying notes 1-4 supra.
84
See note 77 supra and accompanying text.
85 See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 9, at 1254, 1262; New Safeguar&, supa note
9, at 745-46.
86 See note 70 supra.
87 See text accompanying notes 114-32 infra.
88 "Federal funding can be withdrawn from a state program that fails to comply with federal conditions relevant to the purpose of that program, if the conditions
are 'necessary and proper' to achieving the objectives of the funding and do not
require drastic or unusual restructuring of state governmental machinery." Stewart,
supra note 9, at 1262.
89 "If National League of Cities is interpreted as establishing a balancing
test weighing the relative importance of the federal interest against the strength of
the state's interest in autonomy, then in extreme cases the balance may swing
against federal grants-in-aid that impose conditions subverting the independence of
state legislatures." Dam, supra note 2, at 293-94 (footnote omitted).
9
o See note 88 supra.
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In Montgomery County v. Califano,91 local officials argued that
a grant program 92 offended the tenth amendment by shifting control of health-care delivery from the county to agencies appointed
by the governor. In barest terms, the local elected officials complained that they had been bypassed in favor of specialists, a complaint reminiscent of Shapp. The court, however, was not swayed,
concluding instead that although governmental structure was
changed, the grant program was constitutional because the agencies
received local substantive input.
Applying the line of cases from Steward93 to North Carolinaex
rel Morrow v. Califano,94 the court decided that the governmental
structure dictated by the program served "a legitimate national end"
and that the sanction of withholding federal funds did not "cross
the line which divides inducement from coercion." 95 Satisfied
that the program survived traditional spending-power analysis, the
court nonetheless addressed NLC: Montgomery County was significantly different from NLC, it said, because the program did not
"displace local initiative with federal directives." 96 The court
also observed that the new agencies would be "manned by area residents, some or many of whom will be local elected officials." 97
Because of this local input, the program did not interfere with state
sovereignty as prohibited by NLC. 98
Although the court's inquiry into the amount of local input
shows some concern for state sovereignty, the court showed no
solicitude for the state's governmental process or structure; instead,
its concern was with local substantive input. Thus, measured by
the standard of Montgomery County, the mere provision for local
input removes any objection that block grants might impair the
"integrity of the states," 99 even if the input is structured differently
from the state's chosen governmental apparatus.
91 449 F. Supp. 1230 (D. Md. 1978).
92 National Health Planning and Resources Development Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k300t (1976).

93 Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).

94445 F. Supp. 532 (E.D.N.C. 1977), af'd mem., 435 U.S. 962 (1978).
95 449 F. Supp. at 1247.
96 Id. This quotation is from the traditional spending-power analysis but is by
reference incorporated in the NLC argument. See id. 1248.

97 Id. 1247.
98 Id.

99Id.

1248.
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In FloridaDepartmentof Health and Rehabilitative Services v.
Califano,100 a state plan for reorganization of its health department
conflicted with a federal grant program1 01 because the state divided administrative responsibility for the program instead of giving
"substantial authority" to a single director. 10 2 The court rejected
Florida's argument that the program, "to the extent it conditions
receipt of federal grant monies on the adoption by a state of a particular governmental structure, constitutes an invalid encroachment
upon the powers... of the states in derogation of" the tenth amendment and NLC.

0 3n

The court based its decision on a "narrow" reading of NLC.104
Expressing doubt that NLC applies to the spending power, the court
noted that insofar as the grant conditions interfered with state
governmental structure, "the federal intrusion is wholly indirect."
Furthermore, it said that the conditional nature of the grant program made it "purely voluntary" rather than "coercive" or "mandatory." 105

Taken together, Florida Department of Health and Montgomery County demonstrate NLC's limited impact on state-federal
relations: a condition that interferes with state governmental structure is constitutional as long as local input remains and the program
is voluntary. The LEAA program involved in Shapp meets these
criteria. Although it interferes with the state legislature's role, it
substitutes another local figure, the governor. 10 6 The program is
of the same voluntary nature as the one in FloridaDepartment of
Health. Thus, an argument that the grant conditions in Shapp
are unconstitutional cannot be based on a generalized notion that
a state's governmental structure is beyond the reach of Congress's
spending power; rather it must rest on the particular interference
by LEAA and on the special status of checks and balances.
C. The Special Sovereignty Interest in Checks and Balances
Before discussing whether anything about Shapp should make
it an exception to the usual spending-power analysis-that is,
whether the particular state governmental structure that has been
100 449 F. Supp. 274 (N.D. Fla.), aff'd mem., 585 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2051 (1979).
101 Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1976).
102 449 F. Supp. at 282.
103 Id. 283.
104 Id. 284.
LO5 Id.

106 See text accompanying notes 17-20 supra.
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interfered with deserves special protection-it is useful to consider
the special concern with protecting a state's political institutions
' In one view, such issues are
and mechanisms for their own sake.107
unimportant because federalism itself is only marginally significant. 0 8 Another perspective, however, emphasizes the critical role
of the states in the political system: 109 they prevent overdomination
by a central federal regime and serve as laboratories for experimentation 110 which counteract any stagnation resulting from having
only a single centralized source of law. 111
Vigorous state legislatures and judiciaries are crucial to performance of these functions and therefore deserve constitutional
protection. 11 2

Accordingly,

federal

action

causing

substantial

atrophy of state legislatures or state political dialogue should be
suspect. This argument, however, is overly broad: it would invalidate all grant conditions because they are presumably imposed
to restrict action by state officials. 113 Solicitude for state sovereignty
interests would at first glance seem less critical in cases involving
block grants such as those of LEAA, in which Congress has bowed
to state interests and given local officials broad responsibility. After
all, Congress could have imposed stricter grant conditions or pro07

A preliminary question might be why the courts, rather than members of
Congress elected from the states, should resolve federalism controversies. Commentators are divided on this issue. See Choper, The Scope of National Power
Vis-a-Vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552,
1560-63 (1977); Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal
Protection, 27 STAN. L. REv. 603, 613-14 (1975); Stewart, supra note 9, at 1263-72;
Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Power Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HAav. L. REV. 682,
712-13 (1976); Wechsler, supra note 9; Municipal Bankruptcy, supra note 9, at
1884-91.
In any event, a footnote in NLC rejects the view that Congress, not the courts,
should safeguard federalism. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833,
841 n.12 (1976).
108 See, e.g., Choper, supra note 107, at 1565-67, 1611-21.
1

109 See, e.g., Municipal Bankruptcy, supra note 9, at 1886-87.
110 "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country." New State Ice
Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
11 Municipal Bankruptcy, supra note 9, at 1886-87. See also Linde, Justice
Douglas on Freedom in the Welfare State-Constitutional Rights in the Public
Sector, 39 WASH. L. REv. 4, 28-31 (1964).
112 See U.S. ADvisoRY COMMIsSION ON lN-EG ovE1NM1ENTAL RELATIONS, MAxuo THE SAFE STRETs AcT WORK: AN INTERGOVERNmENTAL CHALLENGE, No. A-36,
15, 17 (1970) [hereinafter cited as ACIR CHALLENGE].
11 3
This argument has also been rejected in the spending-power cases. See
text accompanying notes 72-77 and 91-106 supra.
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vided for administration entirely by federal officials. 114 Surely, administration by state or local officials would be preferable. 115
Deeper analysis, however, suggests that a particular type of
structural integrity--a state's chosen system of checks and balancesis seriously affected when Congress bypasses state legislatures and
dictates that governors and state bureaucracies, together with their
federal counterparts, shall decide how federal grants are spent.
Although such interference with state structural integrity has rarely
evoked a state-protecting response in spending-power cases, interference with checks and balances, because it converts the governor
into a virtual legislator, should be constitutionally impermissible
not only because it is a particularly great intrusion on a state's
autonomy but also because it runs roughshod over a system of government which still substantially represents the normative sense of
how intragovernmental powers ought to be organized. Indeed,
letting federal agents bypass state governments altogether by dictating exactly how grants are spent disrupts state sovereignty less than
giving discretion to only one branch of government at the risk of
upsetting the state's internal balance of power.
A state's chosen system of separation of powers may indeed be a
basic element of statehood protected by the Constitution. 1 6 One
justice has expressed great concern over the prospect of a branch
of the federal government reviewing a state's governmental structure:
It would make the deepest inroads upon our federal system
for this Court now to hold that it can determine the appropriate distribution of powers and their delegation within
the forty-eight states. As the earlier Mr. Justice Harlan
said for a unanimous Court in Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S.
71, 84 [1902]:
"Whether the legislative, executive and judicial
powers of a State shall be kept altogether distinct
and separate, or whether persons or collections of
persons belonging to one department may, in respect to some matters, exert powers which, strictly
speaking, pertain to another department of gov114 Linde, supra note 111, at 30 n.111. Some commentators say that direct
federal administration of grants would be so unwieldy as to be impracticable. They
conclude that Congress therefore might accept judicial limits on grant conditions
rather than switch to direct federal administration. See id.; Stewart, supra note 9,
at 1240-41.
115 See text accompanying notes 96-98 supra.
116 See note 64 supra and text accompanying notes 64-66 supra.
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117

This view recommends itself not only because of its high regard
for separation of powers,"" but also because a system of checks and
balances is, by its very nature, fragile: it can easily be destroyed
by federal spending. State legislators fear that as federal aid
increases and accounts for a larger portion of a state's available resources,"1 9 their importance and effectiveness will decline unless
they exert some control over the expenditure of such funds: their
political accountability for in-state programs would decline. Legislators contend that their "inherent right" to control state spending
"is at the heart of the practical exercise of power at the state
level." 120
This argument was important to the decision in Shapp, in
which the court noted:
[T]wenty-five percent of Pennsylvania's budget is now derived from federal funds. The logical result of appellant's
argument [that the executive branch controls the funds]if the percentage were, as an example, to reach one hundred percent-would be to eliminate the need for a legislative branch of government. The federal government could
simply supply federal monies to the executive branch
which would then proceed to administer the revenue without appropriation of any of the monies by the legislature.'21
The danger, in the court's view, was not merely hypothetical:
To hold that the Executive has control of these federal
funds . . .would result in . . . obliteration of the distinc-

tions between the separate functions and powers of these
two co-equal branches of government. .

.

. With a large

portion of the state budget now provided by federal funding, the executive branch could well end up with as much
legislative responsibility as the General Assembly itself.
117 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 256 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring in the result); cf. Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League,
415 U.S. 605, 615 n.13 (1974) ("[Tihe State of Pennsylvania may . . . pattern its
government after the scheme set forth in the Federal Constitution or any other way
it sees fit. The Constitution does not impose on the States any particular plan for
the distribution of governmental powers.") (Citation omitted).
11 See text accompanying notes 128-32 infra.

119 See text accompanying notes 1-2 supra.
120 ACIR BuLL., supra note 1, at 14 (remarks of Harold Schreier); see text
accompanying note 4 supra.
121 480 Pa. at 468, 391 A.2d at 604.

1979]

FEDERAL SPENDING AND STATE CHECKS AND BALANCES

421

It is that result which we feel would "clearly and palpably"
violate the doctrine of separation of powers embodied in
22
our Constitution.
The delicate balance of power had already been upset. The squabble over the special prosecutor's office revealed the capacity of the
executive branch to spend money despite legislative disapproval' m
The Pennsylvania legislature cited still other instances of federal
grants being used by state bureaucrats to establish or perpetuate
programs specifically rejected by the legislature. 2 4 Fiscal conservatives also objected that federal monies were used as a foot in the
door to start programs that the legislature would subsequently be
under political pressure to continue after the federal funding ceased.
The Governor's brief responded that the LEAA grant program
did not deprive the legislature of control because the lawmakers
can always deny state agencies authorization to apply for federal
grants in the first place.tm This "right of first refusal," however,
requires the legislators to make an irrevocable commitment when
plans are still embryonic, subject to modification by federal authorities, and months away from actual implementation. Thus, the
legislature's ability to respond to constantly changing circumstances
and needs is impaired. 26 Although the legislature can theoretically
withhold aggregate matching funds at a later stage, this forfeiture of
federal assistance on a lump-sum basis because of a few objectionable
projects within a program can be politically and economically
hazardous. 27 Because none of these options grants the legislature
truly effective leverage and discretion in the federal funding process,
it is questionable whether the balance between the legislative and
executive branches is preserved.
122

Id. at 469-70, 391 A.2d at 605 (emphasis added).

123 See note 29 supra.
124 Brief

for Appellee at 3.

See also Record at 256a-63a.

For instance, it said

that, during two previous years, increasing concern over the size and attendant

expenses of the central office staff for the state Drug Abuse Council had caused
the legislators to initiate cutbacks in that agency's award of state monies in an
effort to cut waste and ensure that funds for treatment of addicts would reach their
intended destination, the field programs. The response of the agency was to reallocate its federal grant dollars to the central office, undermining the legislative intent
Id.
125 Brief for Appellants at 37, 41 [hereinafter cited as Governor's Brief].
126 The same objections apply to the suggestion that, at least in the case of
the LEAA, the legislature can pass substantive legislation vetoing specific projects
at the advisory review stage, before the state agency submits its plan to LEAA.
See note 28 supra.
127 See note 29 supra.
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By interfering with a state's chosen distribution of powers, programs such as the LEAA invade one of the basic elements of state
sovereignty. Such an impact should raise tenth-amendment concerns even in a spending-power context because the existence of
coequal branches of government represents the normative sense of
how intragovernmental powers ought to be organized. 128 Indeed,
since the writing of the Constitution, the doctrine of checks and
balances has been regarded as a "political maxim," basic to
liberty. 129 "No political truth is certainly of more intrinsic value,
or is stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons . . . ." 1
The LEAA program does not merely upset the
normative balance of power: it interferes with a power that is normatively the legislature's-the power of appropriation.' 31 The Shapp
court reasoned:
The federal government may impose conditions and limitations upon the monies it allocates to the states and the
General Assembly must stay within those guidelines or refuse the grant. Within each grant, however, there remains
128 See generally Tin FEDRALisT No. 47 (J. Madison); see also Dreyer v.
Illinois, 187 U.S. 73, 84 (1902).
12 9 Ts. FEDRArLIsr No. 47 (J. Madison) 336 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (1st ed.
New York 1788).
130 Id.; see M. Vx.E, CONSTrrUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF PowERs 1-2

(1967):
[T]he doctrine of the separation of powers has, in modem times, been the
most significant, both intellectually and in terms of its influence upon
institutional structures. It stands alongside that other great pillar of
Western political thought-the concept of representative government-as
the major support for systems of government which are labelled "constitutional." . . . [Ilt remains, in some form or other, the most useful tool for
the analysis of Western systems of government, and the most effective
embodiment of the spirit which lies behind those systems.
131 One court has said:
Under all constitutional governments recognizing three distinct and independent magistracies, the control of the purse strings of government is a
legislative function; indeed, it is the supreme legislative prerogative, indispensable to the independence and integrity of the legislature, and not to
be surrendered or abridged, save by the constitution itself, without disturbing the balance of the system and endangering the liberties of the
people....
This supreme prerogative of the legislature, called in question
by Charles I., was the issue upon which parliament went to war with the
king, with the result that ultimately the absolute control of parliament over
the public treasury was forever vindicated as a fundamental principle of the
British Constitution. The American commonwealths have fallen heirs to
this great principle, and the prerogative in question passes to their legislatures without restriction or diminution, except as provided by their constitutions, by the simple grant of legislative power.
Colbert v. State, 86 Miss. 769, 775, 39 So. 65, 66 (1905).
See also, e.g., U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7; PA. CoNST. art. II,
§ 24; text accompanying note 4 supra.
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the necessity to establish spending priorities and to allocate
the available monies. This is properly a legislative func13 2

tion.

To summarize this inquiry, it was first shown that the constitutional protection of state services discussed in NLC logically extends
to a state's governmental structure. Although a state's structural
integrity is not normally protected from exercise of the spending
power, the exercise of that power in Shapp is exceptionally intrusive because it upsets the delicate balance of power existing between
a state's executive and legislative branches. A state's chosen system
of checks and balances should be immune from congressional interference because the existence of coequal branches contributes to
the vigor of state governments and thus, indirectly, to the vitality of
the federal system. Moreover, this system represents the normative
view of how powers in government should be arranged.
D. Limits to Balancing
If congressional intrusion upon a state's system of checks and
balances is deemed serious enough to merit judicial scrutiny and
warrant departure from traditional spending-power analysis, NLC 133
suggests that a court's next step may be to weigh the state interest
against the asserted federal interests13 Unfortunately, applying a
balancing test to Shapp 135 demonstrates the problems of this approach and may not furnish the state interest with sufficient protection.
The first step is to examine the federal interest, which is,
as is often the case, efficiency. In the case of LEAA, committee
reports reflect Congress's belief that gubernatorial authority would
centralize state planning and speed the state-level approval of local
subgrants.' 86 Furthermore, executive control would avoid legisla132 480

Pa. at 470, 391 A.2d at 605.

133426 U.S. 833 (1976).

134 Although the majority opinion seemed to avoid actual balancing, judges and
commentators have interpreted it as a balancing case. See, e.g., Usery v. Board of
Educ., 421 F. Supp. 718, 719-20 (D. Utah 1976); New Safeguards, supra note 9,
at 730-31; Comment, Emerging Concepts of Federalism: Limitation on the Spending
Power and National Health Planning, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1133, 1151 (1977).
Indeed, the strongest argument for balancing is that one member of the five-man
majority in NLC thought the Court was using some sort of balancing. See National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856 (1976) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
135 480 Pa. 449, 391 A.2d 595 (1978), appeal dismissed sub nom. Thornburgh
v. Casey, 440 U.S. 942 (1979).
136 See S. REP. No. 94-847, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17, reprinted in [1976]
U.S. CODE CONG. & An. Nzws 5374, 5381-82; H.R. REP. No. 94-1155, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 13; text accompanying note 25 supra.
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tive "politicization" of the program. 37 A third rationale was that
state legislators typically are removed from problems of urban crime
and the needs of big cities. 38 Finally, Congress believed gubernatorial supervision of LEAA was appropriate because "overall responsibility of law enforcement services resides with the chief executive." 139
Efficiency is certainly a legitimate concern of Congress in spending federal funds, but, whether a court were to apply a balancing
or a least-restrictive-means approach, 40 it would have to consider
whether fuller participation in appropriations by the state legislature would be as effective as the statutory process. If not, the court
would still have to decide if the marginally greater effectiveness of
the congressional measure outweighed the intrusion on the state
system of checks and balances.
This question requires an empirical inquiry that courts are
ill-equipped to conduct. For example, governors may argue that
legislative approval of each grant would destroy a state's flexibility
to pursue unexpected grants, and also that the legislature's fragmented committee structure, insufficient staff, and lack of grantsmanship militate against meaningful participation in federal grant
appropriations.
On the other hand, legislatures have recently
moved towards greater "professionalization," 141 including larger
and better-trained staffs and better-paid legislators. Moreover, in
big states with sizeable tax revenues, legislative staffs are responsible
for year-round budgetary planning.
Other pros and cons could be cited,'4 but the basic point is
that the federal interests involved reflect highly pragmatic political
considerations, and judges are unlikely to be able to measure these
considerations and then weigh them against a state's abstract, normative interest in preserving traditional checks and balances. As one
137

See text accompanying note 25 supra.

138

ACIR

CHALLENGE,

supra note 112, at 15, 17.

139 S. RaP. No. 94-847, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CoNG. & AD. NEws 5374, 5381.
140 See Municipal Bankruptcy, supra note 9, at 1890.
141 ACIR BuLL., supra note 1, at 2.
142 For example, the contention that an executive agency could best coordinate
LEAA plans and expenditures, see text accompanying note 136 supra, might be
rebutted with the contention that if the legislature had more control, legislative
committees could better integrate LEAA activities with state-funded plans. There
is also evidence that, despite Congress's hopes, governors have exerted little supervision over LEAA planning, see note 23 supra, and that governors are as capable
as legislators of politicization and other abuses. See H.R. RFP. No. 92-1072, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 10-60 (1972); U.S. ADvisoRY Co.mnssioN ON INTERcOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS, SAFE STREETS RECONsmERED:

1975, No. A-55 at 60, 200-01 (1977).
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commentator has expressed it, "Comparing the utility gains from
state compliance with federal programs with losses to state autonomy
is like the proverbial comparison of apples and oranges." 143
This dilemma illustrates the difficulty of applying the stateprotecting doctrine of NLC by means of a balancing approach.
The federal and state interests are incapable of clear balance or are
incommensurable. To avoid such pitfalls, it has been suggested
that NLC be implemented by means of a categorical approach,
which depends not on the weight of the federal interest but on its
nature. 44 Thus, in an "emergency," 146 even a state's sovereignty
interest in checks and balances would have to yield. Where, however, Congress clearly and substantially strengthens one branch of
state government in the budgetary process at another's expense
merely for efficiency, then the bypassed branch is entitled to constitutional protection. Nothing in this analysis prevents Congress
from carrying out a program solely through federal agents; rather,
all that is suggested is that when Congress employs state governmental machinery to plan and administer a program, then Congress
must respect the state system of checks and balances.
This result may be the actual effect of the decision in Shapp
and the Supreme Court's dismissal of the appeal. This manner of
resolution, however, is unsatisfactory in light of Congress's express
grant of mere advisory review and express intent that state legislatures have no power to approve or disapprove. The analysis in
this part has shown how the same effect should have been achieved
in a more explicit, principled fashion.
III. REm EDsS
The possibility remains that the argument in the preceding
part against Congress's authority to alter a state's chosen system of
checks and balances might be accepted by courts in a commerceclause context and yet be deemed irrelevant where, as in Shapp,
the disruptive regulation is based on the spending power and conIndeed, it is unclear
143 Stewart, supra note 9, at 1236 (footnote omitted).
what percentage of a state's budget would have to be occupied by federal grants
before a court would find a state's internal separation of powers impaired. The
majority opinion in NLC disclaimed the need for factual determinations of impact
on state government: it perhaps recognized that a court would still be left wondering how to interpret the numbers. 426 U.S. at 851-52.
144 Stewart, supra note 9, at 1236.
145
Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 548 (1975), quoted in NLC, 426 U.S.
at 853. The "emergency" in Fry involved a wage and price freeze. Justice Blackmun suggested that certain environmental programs might also be "emergencies."
NLC, 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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sists of a condition attached to a federal grant. If the spending
power dictates a different result, it is because cases like Oklahoma
v. United States Civil Service Commission 46 and Florida Department of Health v. Califano' 47 indicate that the state's decision to
accept the federal grant remains voluntary: it retains the ability
to opt out.
This fact has important implications for the type of remedy a
governor can expect if a court rejects the thesis of the preceding
part and agrees with him that a state reappropriation statute impermissibly conflicts with a valid federal condition vesting control
of federal grants in the executive branch. If the presumed voluntariness of federal spending programs is, in fact, the only factor
which saves a congressional intrusion upon state separation of
powers from being unconstitutional, then a legislature's lack of consent to the intrusive federal condition-as expressed in a noncomplying state statute-should render the governor ineligible to receive
1 48
the affected federal funds.
In Shapp, however, the Governor argued that a state law providing legislative control of federal aid violated the supremacy
clause and was therefore void. The relief he sought was not teranination of federal funding but rather injunctive and declaratory
relief permitting him to carry out the LEAA plan without the
legislature's approval. 14 9 The Governor relied'5 0 on a line of cases
beginning with King v. Smith 151 which indicate that a federal grant
condition could invalidate a conflicting state law.
In King, the Supreme Court found that a state-imposed welfare restriction conflicted with a federal condition attached to welfare funds given to the state. Instead of deciding that the state
was thus disqualified from receiving federal funds, the Court
unanimously concluded that the state law was void. 15 2

Various

Justices have sought to clarify King, reminding their brethren that
146330 U.S. 127, 143-44 (1947).
147 449 F. Supp. 274 (N.D. Fla.), affjd mem., 585 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2051 (1979).
148 This view is endorsed by the Solicitor General: "The executive branch of

Pennsylvania cannot claim a right to receive federal money despite the legislative
branch's refusal to abide by the conditions of eligibility.

The whole State--

including the executive branch-loses its eligibility when the legislative branch
refuses to cooperate."

Solicitor's Brief, supra note 28, at 18-19.

of this argument in text accompanying notes 156-57 infra.
149 Governor's Brief, supra note 125, at 3-7.
150 Id. 80-84.

151392 U.S. 309 (1968).
152

Id. 333 n.34.

But see discussion
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the terms of a grant program are "in no way mandatory upon the
states under the Supremacy Clause," 153 and that the state might
avoid the federal condition simply by rejecting the federal funds.
There is some suggestion that application of King is triggered
only when a state has accepted federal funds and actually spent them
in a way inconsistent with attached conditions.15 4 By assuming in
the appeal of Shapp to the Supreme Court 15r that the Pennsylvania
General Assembly had not, in reappropriating federal grants, actually rerouted or diverted federal dollars but had simply allowed
the money for unwanted projects to lapse and revert to LEAA, the
Solicitor General in his brief distinguished King and therefore
recommended dismissal of the governor's request for fiscal control
of such lapsed funds.150
The governor's right to specific enforcement of a grant in the
event a state legislature's reappropriation statute is struck down,
however, should not turn on an imprecise factual determination of
whether or not a state has yet "accepted" federal funds. Assuming
one can determine the time of acceptance, it is usually possible and
more consistent with spending-power principles for a court, even
after such acceptance, simply to enjoin further use of the funds and
53 Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 292 (1971) (Burger, C.., concurring).
See also Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309,
335 n.3 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring). The Court's decisions in King and
Townsend to mandate state compliance with the AFDC grant conditions under the
supremacy clause may be attributable to the adverse impact which terminating
federal funds would have had on the welfare recipients ultimately involved in
those cases. The Court may have simply been trying to avoid such risks by
declaring the state law invalid. See Tomlinson & Mashaw, The Enforcement of
Federal Standards in Grant-in-Aid Programs: Suggestions for Beneficiary Involvement, 58 VA. L. REv. 600, 633 (1972).
154 See, e.g., Bacon v. Toia, 437 F. Supp. 1371, 1383-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1977),
aff'd mem., 580 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Frazer, 317 F. Supp.
1079 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
155 Thornburgh v. Casey, 440 U.S. 942 (1979).
150 Solicitor's Brief, supra note 28, at 18, 19 n.16. Referring to Shapp v.
Sloan, the Solicitor General commented:
This is not a case like King v. Smith . . . or Townsend v. Swank . ..
in which a private person claiming entitlement under federal law establishes that a state has accepted federal funds but nonetheless is expending
them in ways prohibited by substantive federal rules. In such cases courts
properly may insist that the state use the monies in the way Congress
directed.
Id. 19 n.16 (citations omitted). The last sentence leaves ambiguous whether the
Solicitor General would have recommended giving the Governor the relief he desired
if shown evidence that the Pennsylvania legislators did expend the funds intended
for the special prosecutor's office. The position of this Comment is that recoupment
of any misapplied funds should be the preferred remedy because it preserves the
legislative branch's traditional choice either to comply with or opt out of a federal
grant program.
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give the legislature a brief period either to cure the noncompliance
or else forfeit the funds back to the federal government, not the
governor.157 If a governor's claim for specific performance of the
grant program is ever to succeed, it should only be in those cases
where he actually "stands in the shoes" of citizen-beneficiaries whom
a court finds deserving of such equitable relief. 58
The major point is that a governor's presence in such litigation should not, by itself, obscure or preempt traditional spendingpower analysis or convert such federal-state disputes into supremacyclause cases. Accordingly, if in the future a governor challenges a
reappropriation statute in federal court and prevails, that court
should give the state legislature time to reconsider and choose between curing the noncomplying appropriation statute and forfeiting the federal block grants affected. The court ought not to
ignore the legislature's resistance to the federal condition merely
because the governor is willing to spend the money in accordance
with that condition. Because giving state governors almost exclusive
jurisdiction over federal aid might be an impermissible intrusion
on state sovereignty under NLC and the tenth amendment but for
the legislature's presumed consent, great weight must therefore be
given to the legislature's objections.
CONCLUSION

Encouraged by the result in Shapp v. Sloan, 59 a state legislature may reappropriate federal block grants in ways conflicting with
federal law. If a federal agency like LEAA responds by cutting off
the grants, and the legislature sues the agency to retain the funds,
then the court may have to face the troublesome constitutional
question that was avoided in Shapp.
Put simply, that question is: Does Congress violate the tenth
amendment when it puts conditions on federal spending that upset a
157 Such a remedy was adopted by the Supreme Court in Rosado v. Wyman,
397 U.S. 397 (1970).
158 Cf. Califano v. Westcott, 99 S. Ct. 2655, 2663 (1979) (equitable con-

siderations support correcting rather than invalidating defective welfare grants).
Cases also may arise where a federal agency can show that its remedies at law,

such as recoupment or termination of funds, are inadequate, as where a state
legislature suddenly seeks to pull out of a half-completed federally supported construction project. The termination of Pennsylvania's Office of the Special Prosecutor
on the verge of indictments, see note 36 supra, was arguably such a special case.
Where LEAA had agreed to provide total federal funding for the project, a court
might have been justified in sustaining the federally supported prosecutor to completion, even if state legislators had preferred to return the federal monies instead.
159

480 Pa. 449, 391 A.2d 595 (1978), appeal dismissed sub nom. Thornburgh

v. Casey, 440 U.S. 942 (1979).
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state's balance of powers? This Comment has shown that, under National League of Cities v. Usery,160 direct interference with a state's
checks and balances would raise a substantial constitutional question.
Under traditional spending-power analysis, however, only
extreme disruption of a state's governmental structure by grant
conditions can transgress constitutional limitations. Because of the
importance and delicacy of checks and balances, interference with
them qualifies as such an "extreme disruption" and should be constitutionally proscribed despite the usual deference paid to federal
grant conditions in spending-power cases. Furthermore, it is improper to read NLC to require a rigid balancing test which would
be contrary to this analysis.
Even if the congressional interference with state government is
not considered so extreme as to invalidate the interfering grant condition, constitutional considerations limit the relief available to federal agencies or state governors seeking compliance with the grant.
Courts should give the state legislature an opportunity either to
conform to the grant condition or else to forfeit the conditioned
funds altogether. Only in exceptional circumstances does equity
require that federal funds be granted to a governor to spend against
his legislature's will.
Woodrow Wilson once said that the relationship of federal and
state governments "cannot . . . be settled by the opinion of any

one generation, because it is a question of growth, and every successive stage of our political and economic development gives it a
new aspect, makes it a new question." 161 The growth of federal
funds in state budgets and the increased gubernatorial discretion
in administering these funds make the role of state legislatures in
federal grant programs such "a new question."
160 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
161W. WILSON, CoNsTrrunoNAL CovERNmENT IN TH

(1911).
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